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A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
by Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss.  Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  203 pp.  Hardback $85.00. 
 
Reviewed by Molly Land, University of Connecticut School of Law. 
molly.land@law.uconn.edu.1 
 
Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s recent book, A NEOFEDERALIST 
VISION OF TRIPS, is an important and exciting new addition to debates 
about international intellectual property governance.  In this book, the 
authors take on one of the field’s most central questions:  is the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in fact an 
intellectual property “code”?  The authors argue that TRIPS is commonly 
misconstrued, both by rights holders and academics, as a supranational code 
that tells members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) “what they 
must do and when and how they must do it” (p.5).  Although many have 
argued that TRIPS imposes only minimum standards, Dinwoodie and 
Dreyfuss provide in this book the most thorough and decisive refutation of 
the “code” view of TRIPS to date.  The authors contend that TRIPS is not a 
code but a “neofederalist” regime that imposes basic substantive 
expectations in order to promote coordination but which nonetheless 
preserves considerable member state autonomy. 
 
A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS addresses both the 
fragmentation of norms and the fragmentation of authority in international 
intellectual property law, 2  with a particular emphasis on the latter.  In 
particular, the book draws attention to the TRIPS regime’s allocation of 
authority between states and international institutions. 3   Dinwoodie and 
Dreyfuss consider this “vertical” allocation of authority between states and 
international institutions under the TRIPS agreement in historical, textual, 
and structural terms.  They argue that the TRIPS regime is 
“neofederalist”—not in a constitutional sense,4 but rather in terms of the 
considerable discretion it reserves to states to implement intellectual 
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property policies in ways responsive to local needs.  Calling for increased 
use of techniques such as proportionality analysis (p.107), the book makes a 
compelling case for state autonomy in regulating innovation policy through 
the framework of the TRIPS agreement. 
 
The book proceeds in three sections, looking at the past, present, and future 
of global intellectual property lawmaking.  The first section, entitled 
“Where We Were”, considers the history of this regulation and the genesis 
of the TRIPS agreement.  The authors support their case for a neofederalist 
understanding of TRIPS by pointing to the central demands that have 
shaped global intellectual property lawmaking over time—the need for 
balance, diversity among countries in terms of priorities and innovation 
strategies, and changes in the creative ecosystem.  These demands are best 
accommodated within a structure that “gives states autonomy to address the 
complexity, diversity, and historical contingency of intellectual property 
law” but at the same time “requires them to act within the overlay of a 
coordinated international intellectual property regime” (p.14).  Dinwoodie 
and Dreyfuss then turn to the negotiating history of TRIPS, arguing that 
although some of the states involved in the negotiations sought to make 
TRIPS into a global “code”, the resulting document was the product of real 
compromise and protects considerable state discretion and autonomy in 
implementing TRIPS’s minimum standards. 
 
The second part of the book, entitled “Where We Are”, examines how 
TRIPS operates in practice.  The authors first consider a series of national 
innovations in intellectual property lawmaking in light of the existing 
jurisprudence of the dispute settlement bodies of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  They conclude that the impact of dispute resolution 
has been mixed, with some decisions respecting national autonomy and 
others adopting a more restrictive approach.  The authors then turn to the 
structural features of the TRIPS agreement, including the principles of 
national treatment, most favored nation, and non-discrimination.  They 
argue that national treatment, in particular, would provide more appropriate 
guidance for panels addressing the validity of new innovations such as 
sharing workloads among national patent offices and the EU Database 
Directive.  The final chapter in this section argues that in evaluating local 
policy innovations, dispute settlement panels should consider tradeoffs in 
legislation overall rather than looking at particular policies in isolation; 
afford more room to states seeking to respond to changes in the innovation 
ecology; and consider the special problems of capacity faced by developing 
countries. 
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The final section, “Where We Are Going”, presents the authors’ vision for 
the future.  The first chapter in this section considers the fragmentation of 
intellectual property lawmaking.  Arguing that fragmentation must be 
managed in order to ensure the coherence needed for a robust innovation, 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss suggest several techniques for integrating non-
WTO law into TRIPS lawmaking in order to “gain the benefits of 
regulatory competition while minimizing its costs” (p.147).  In considering 
whether to use non-trade law, the authors contend that panels and the 
Appellate Body should consider the source of the norm, its timing, 
governance issues (e.g., “hard” versus “soft” law), and the degree of overlap 
in coverage between the norm and the subject matter of TRIPS.  The final 
chapter then introduces the idea of a global intellectual property “acquis”—
a set of “background norms” that might guide intellectual property policy-
making on the international level (p.176)—and begins to identify in national 
and international sources, judicial lawmaking, and scholarship some of the 
normative commitments that might form the basis of such an acquis.  
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss argue that identifying shared normative 
commitments would aid the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies and remedy 
some of the overly restrictive interpretations identified earlier in the book.  
An international intellectual property acquis could also help foster 
normative integration across regimes and guide future international 
lawmaking in this area.  Among these intellectual property “meta-norms” 
(p.180), the authors include principles about access to knowledge goods 
(what they call “access-regarding principles”), norms designed to adapt to 
the challenges of new technologies, and national treatment for both users 
and producers. 
 
This book makes several important contributions to international 
intellectual property scholarship.  First, Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss decisively 
refute the “code” vision of the TRIPS agreement.  Despite what might seem 
to be widespread agreement in some circles that TRIPS imposes only 
minimum standards, the belief that the treaty is instead a comprehensive 
supranational code of intellectual property rules continues to have 
considerable vitality.  Efforts to use a European Union Regulation to seize 
shipments of medicines while in transit, for example, even when the 
shipments would not violate the intellectual property law of either the 
sending or receiving country, are tied to a perception of TRIPS as imposing 
global norms and limiting individual state discretion to vary intellectual 
property rules in ways that allow generic production.5  More recently, this 
“code” vision is reflected in Eli Lilly’s initiation of arbitration proceedings 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement challenging the 
invalidation of one of its patents by Canadian courts, despite the 
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considerable discretion that TRIPS leaves to member states to decide what 
inventions meet the standards it imposes. 6   Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s 
refutation of the “code” vision of TRIPS is particularly important in light of 
these new intellectual property claims being asserted through enforcement 
measures and in the investment treaty context. 
 
Second, the book provides an extraordinarily useful playbook for defending 
local innovations in intellectual property policy making.  Dinwoodie and 
Dreyfuss provide a comprehensive and pragmatic assessment of how the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies might respond were they asked to assess the 
validity of three recent examples of local policy innovations—raising the 
inventive step, new statutory defenses to patent infringement, and varying 
the relief for infringement.  Their analysis of these innovations is especially 
valuable given how few cases address the scope of TRIPS flexibilities and, 
in particular, the lack of cases litigated by parties with an incentive to 
defend state autonomy.  For TRIPS litigants, scholars, and governmental 
officials, especially from the developing world, the book provides a very 
useful and instructive assessment of the arguments that might be marshaled 
for and against these recent policy initiatives. 
 
Third, the book calls attention to the difficulty tribunals face interpreting 
ambiguous treaties.  Treaties are notoriously indeterminate: capable of 
multiple interpretations and inconsistent both internally and externally. 7  
There is no requirement of a “meeting of the minds” in treaty drafting, and 
indeed, many of the ambiguities in treaties might be understood as precisely 
the opposite—as agreements to disagree. 8   Ambiguities in treaties, and 
particularly the use of standards instead of rules, also reflect the fact that 
anticipating all possible contingencies might have been prohibitively costly 
or even impossible. 9   Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s argument can be 
understood in part as a critique of the interpretive methodology chosen by 
the dispute settlement bodies in the face of such ambiguity in TRIPS 
cases.10  For intellectual property cases, the dispute settlement bodies have 
chosen a strictly textual interpretive methodology, which has resulted in 
awkward and strained reasoning that—as the book persuasively argues—is 
both inconsistent with the text of the agreement and fails to fulfill its goals.  
A methodology that considers context as well as the object and purpose of 
the treaty would better achieve the goals of the global intellectual property 
system that the book articulates at the outset. 
 
The book also points, however, to what is I think an even more fundamental 
problem with interpretation by adjudicators in TRIPS cases: the challenge 
of resolving ambiguities in a text that is designed to achieve a complex 
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variety of goals, many of which are in considerable tension with one 
another. 11  In choosing one interpretation over another—for example, in 
deciding whether databases are covered by the TRIPS agreement—the 
“object and purpose” of the TRIPS agreement could point in several 
different directions at once, as the authors discuss (pp.95-97).  In such 
situations, the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies will inevitably be required 
to choose between competing visions of “the good.”  Even when a broader 
reading would seem consistent with the purpose of the TRIPS agreement—
such as a broader definition of “diagnostic” (p.67) or a more flexible 
interpretation of the term “limited” (p.62)—panels and the Appellate Body 
will still be required to determine where precisely to draw the line between 
monopoly and access.  The TRIPS agreement, however, often provides little 
by way of guidance for navigating hard cases such as these (indeed, as the 
authors note, where the agreement does provide guidance, such as with the 
mention of “fair use” in Article 17, the panel interpreting this provision in 
the EU-GI case was able to better respect the balance that intellectual 
property law seeks to achieve (p.69)).  The result of the lack of overall 
guidance has been a retreat into textual methodologies, an approach that is 
particularly inappropriate in “public law” cases, which require evaluation of 
the state’s authority to regulate in the public interest.12  Such cases may 
require more “purposive” methodologies that allow the decision maker, in 
construing ambiguities in the treaty, to consider the object of the challenged 
state regulation and the interests of non-parties affected by that regulation. 
 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s proposal for an acquis is an important step 
toward developing a common body of values from which adjudicators can 
draw in reaching interpretive decisions.  Of course, at least in the near term, 
the development of an acquis will not necessarily help panels resolve the 
difficult cases.  Because the acquis, as proposed by the authors, is restricted 
to values shared by all WTO members—as must be the case, or risk 
imposing obligations without consent—it will likely be limited to principles 
too general to be of much use in hard cases.  For example, intellectual 
property exporting and importing states might agree that access is an 
important value, but disagree strongly on the precise balance to be struck 
between monopoly and access in particular cases.  That said, an acquis 
might serve—at least for the moment—the more modest goal of reorienting 
the dispute resolution bodies and WTO members alike on the values 
underlying the system and on the interests of non-parties affected by their 
decisions.  Recognizing an acquis will not help panels decide where 
precisely to draw lines, but it may encourage them to view access and other 
public interest values as important countervailing concerns that they can 
and should consider. 
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I do think, however, that the authors might have more fully embraced the 
interpretive role of the WTO dispute settlement bodies.  In several places, 
the authors disavow that the dispute settlement bodies should be engaging 
in “gap filling” (pp.41, 196), express concern over panels making value 
judgments (p.101), and condemn the idea of “judicial activism (p.196).  
Although Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes prohibits the dispute settlement 
bodies from adding to or varying the rights of the parties, it also charges 
them with clarifying the existing provisions. 13   Interpretive authority 
necessarily involves some measure of law creation, and delegation 
accompanied by imprecision—such as we see throughout the TRIPS 
agreement—constitutes a transfer of substantial interpretive authority. 14  
Such delegation is not, however, incompatible with state autonomy in 
setting intellectual property policy.  For all the reasons that the authors set 
forth in the book, the authority delegated to the dispute settlement panels 
should in many instances be re-delegated or re-allocated to the member 
states.15  Their proposals for more deferential standards of review and the 
use of a margin of appreciation (e.g., pp.56, 90, 102, 107-108) are two 
possible techniques for achieving this goal.16  Moreover, the interpretive 
moves recommended by the authors for protecting local intellectual 
property innovations might in fact require the panels to exercise a certain 
measure of interpretive authority.  A departure from strict textualism—even 
if only to re-delegate authority to the state—inherently requires some gap 
filling. 
 
I would also have been interested in even more discussion of the political 
context in which the dispute settlement bodies operate. It may be that what 
is constraining the dispute settlement bodies and causing them to be so 
conservative in their decisions is a function of the political space in which 
they operate.17  Perhaps the discourse around TRIPS has been so contested 
and impassioned that it has led panels to be particularly concerned about 
their expertise and legitimacy.  If this is true, legal arguments alone will not 
be enough to persuade dispute settlement bodies to be less conservative in 
their interpretive methodology.  Attention to the political context may make 
it possible to foster a more supportive political environment for 
neofederalist decision making.  For example, in their work comparing the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) with the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 
Professors Helfer and Alter have argued that the ECJ’s more expansionist 
lawmaking can be attributed to the support of external actors, such as legal 
advocacy networks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national 
courts, and even government officials. 18   In the TRIPS context, greater 
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engagement by NGO networks and other constituencies around particular 
disputes could help support more flexible interpretations of the treaty by 
panels and the Appellate Body.19 
 
With this book, Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss have moved the discussion about 
global intellectual property regulation forward in significant and important 
ways, providing detailed analysis of new local innovations, focusing 
attention on the structural features of the TRIPS agreement, and generating 
new proposals for resolving conflicts of authority and norms both internal 
and external to the TRIPS regime.  It would be a highly valuable read for 




1 The author thanks Harlan Cohen, Cynthia Ho, and Lisa Ramsey for very 
helpful comments and feedback on this review. 
2 See Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative 
Integration as Authority Allocation, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF 
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING 
SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 99, 101-102 
(Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., Hart Publishing, 2008) (distinguishing 
between fragmentation of norms and fragmentation of authority). 
3 See Joel P. Trachtman, Fragmentation and Coherence in International Law 
4 (Aug. 12, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1908862 (distinguishing between horizontal and vertical allocations of 
authority).  Fragmentation of authority is typically thought of primarily as a 
question of the applicable standard of review or judicial abstention.  See, 
e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Panel Deference to 
National Government Decisions: The Misplaced Analogy to the U.S. 
Chevron Standard-of-Review Doctrine, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 187 
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., Kluwer Law International, 1997); William 
W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 283 (2010); Matthew Windsor, A Fine Balance? Delegation, 
Standards of Review, and Subsidiarity in WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 
Aukland University L. Rev. 41 (2008); Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating 
Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for a European 
Human Rights Analogy, 39 Harv. Int’l L. J. 357 (1998). 
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4 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis have argued against understanding 
the WTO as a “federal construct” in a constitutional sense because doing so 
would raise significant legitimacy concerns.  See Robert Howse & Kalypso 
Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global 
Subsidiarity?, in DELIBERATELY DEMOCRATIZING 
MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATION, 1-2 (Marco Verweij & Tim Josling 
eds., 2003) (special issue of Governance, vol. 16, no. 1). 
5 In her recent book on access to medicines, Professor Cynthia Ho considers 
this debate about in-transit seizures and connects it to competing visions of 
patent rights as either privilege or property.  She observes that while the 
privilege view would be opposed to such seizures, those who view patents 
as property rights “may believe so strongly in the sanctity of patent rights 
that if an invention is granted in one country, a patent should be granted in 
other jurisdictions as well.”  Cynthia M. Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON 
PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 290 (Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
6  See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, Investor-State Arbitration to 
Challenge Host State Compliance with International IP Treaties?, 
International Economic Law and Policy Blog (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:07 AM) 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2012/12/investor-state-
arbitration-to-challenge-host-state-compliance-with-international-ip-
treaties.html; Brook K. Baker, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State 
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly and the TPP 18-22 
(PJIP Research Paper Series No. 36, May 2013), available at http://digital 
commons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1038&context=research. 
7 Joel P. Trachtman & Kamal Saggi, Incomplete Harmonization Contracts 
in International Economic Law: Report of the Panel, China—Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, 10 World Trade Rev. 63, 82 (2011). 
8  Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 American J. Int’l L. 247, 273 
(2004); Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 
Harvard Int’l L. J. 333, 351 (1999). 
9 Trachtman & Saggi, supra note 7, at 83. 
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10 Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which as part of 
customary international law is relied on by the WTO adjudicatory bodies, 
provides a rough priority of approaches (favoring textual and purposive 
above the drafting history), there is more than enough “wiggle room” for 
adjudicators to resort to nearly any methodology at any point in time. 
11 The creation of adjudicatory bodies exercising public authority but not 
embedded in a functioning legislature also leads to problems of democratic 
accountability.  See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose 
Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and Its 
Democratic Justification, 23 European J. Int’l L. 7 (2012). 
12 In the investment law context, Professors Burke-White and von Staden 
have defined public law disputes as those “in which the outcome-
determinative issue in the arbitration requires a determination of the state’s 
power and legal authority to undertake regulation in the public interest.”  
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 288.  They argue that 
arbitrators should adopt a more deferential standard of review when the 
subject matter of the arbitration involves public law elements and the 
relevant treaty includes language indicating that the states “sought to 
maintain some freedom of action to regulate in these circumstances.”  Id. at 
293. 
13 In other areas, it appears that the Appellate Body is in fact engaging in a 
kind of constitutional lawmaking designed to protect the purpose of the 
parties’ agreement but which exceeds its ostensible powers under the 
relevant treaties and customary international law.  See Sungjoon Cho, 
Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 University of Pennsylvania J. Int’l L. 
621 (2010) (discussing the Appellate Body’s decision to strike down 
“zeroing” in the anti-dumping context). 
14 See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l 
Organization 401, 415 (2000) (“Imprecision is not synonymous with state 
discretion, however, when it occurs within a delegation of authority and 
therefore grants to an international body wider authority to determine its 
meaning.”); see also, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation 
and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 Virginia J. Int’l L. 103, 111 (2011). 
15 Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 14, at 147-149. 
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16 Other re-delegation techniques include the principle of judicial economy, 
abstention doctrines such as political question or justiciability, interpretive 
principles such as in dubio mitius and non liquet, among others. See 
Steinberg, supra note 8, at 272. 
17 See id. at 267-274 (discussing the political space of the Appellate Body 
and concluding that it had largely attended to political signals from the 
states in trade matters); see generally Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in 
International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 Virginia J. Int’l L. 631, 656-668 
(2005). 
18  These actors “provide [international courts] with constituencies that 
encourage lawmaking and promote compliance with expansionist rulings.” 
Karen J. Alter &Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial 
Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice, 64 Int’l Organization 563, 587 (2010). 
19  See also Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 
Michigan L. R. 1, 8 (2005) (arguing that the World Trade Organization 
needs law and politics to ensure both loyalty and efficiency). 
 
Suggested Citation: 4 The IP Law Book Review 1 (2014). 
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13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE, by Stuart P. Green.  Harvard University Press, 
2012.  400 pp.  Hardback $45.00. 
 




Stuart Green’s book 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE impresses with its 
breadth and insightful detail as the author performs a tour de force in his 
comprehensive treatment of the historically rich and in parts still 
controversial law of theft.  Green argues that the scholarly framework 
regarding theft has remained fairly undeveloped to this day, and he seeks to 
begin to fill this gap by delving into the history of theft law, the essential 
components of theft, the principles behind and unresolved tensions in the 
criminalization of theft, and the question of what constitutes property in the 
context of potential theft.  Concluding, most importantly, that theft law 
today has eliminated moral distinctions and apportions similar punishments 
for vastly different offenses in a manner severely disconnected from 
community sentiments, Green calls for significant reforms of theft law.  As 
part of his discussion, Green also tackles difficult issues relating to the 
application of theft law to intangible property, such as intellectual property, 
virtual property, and information.  The result is a fascinating introduction 
into every major area of theft law, although, as Green himself acknowledges 
throughout, many questions remain for further exploration. 
 
What makes Green’s book particularly interesting for those who study 
intellectual property is that it combines the often-asked question of whether 
intellectual property is truly property with an analysis of how the answer to 
that question in turn shapes criminal law.  The applications of this 
examination are varied and of both legal and ethical significance, 
determining matters such as whether or for how long individuals should be 
imprisoned who never improperly acquired tangible property, but rather 
only goods covered by copyright, trademark, patent, or trade secret law. 
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Chapter 1, entitled “Theft Law Adrift”, examines the history of theft law, 
and in particular the movement in the twenty-first century across 
Anglophone countries to overhaul arbitrary and inconsistent systems of 
theft law.  The American Model Penal Code (MPC), the English Theft Act 
1968, and similar legislation sought to eliminate some of the archaic 
distinctions that the common law drew between various related offenses as 
well as some of the unhelpful categorizations of different types of property.  
The main goals were ones of consolidation and streamlining, but Green 
argues that—in addition to cleaning up arcana—the reforms also swept 
aside useful moral distinctions regarding the means of committing theft and 
the types of property stolen.  Green explains that the corresponding flaws in 
legislation neither have been nor can be corrected at the sentencing level, 
whether through sentencing guidelines or individual judicial decision-
making (pp.30-33).  One of the key problems with the consolidated 
schemes, Green states, is that they violate the principle of fair labeling 
(pp.52-54), which dictates that the law must reflect and signal the 
community’s perceptions of differences in the kinds and respective gravity 
of offenses; hence, crimes should be categorized and labeled such as to 
embody the type and extent of legal violations. 
 
In pursuit of achieving fair labeling in theft law, Green conducted extensive 
empirical work that he describes in the book (pp.57-68) in which he sought 
to test the community’s perceptions of various theft-related legal wrongs 
and uncover whether the law reflects these sentiments.  Some of the study 
stimuli to which he exposed his experiment participants included scenarios 
involving the theft of a bicycle and scenarios describing the theft of a test 
preparation tool.  He varied aspects of the scenarios such as the means by 
which the relevant theft was committed or its likely financial impact.  Green 
asked participants to grade and rank the blameworthiness of the offender 
between different variations of the bicycle theft and of the test preparation 
tool theft, and the participants also had to assign a sentence to the offenders 
in the bicycle theft scenarios.  The study results provided evidence for a 
chasm between people’s intuitions and the existing consolidated law of 
theft, with participants giving more weight to the type of theft and kind of 
property involved than theft law considers. 
 
In Chapter 2, named “The Gist of Theft”, Green attempts to “develop a 
theory of theft law practically from scratch” (p.69).  He begins by 
examining the role of blameworthiness in the criminal law, or to what 
extent particular types of conduct can be said to entail moral fault. Building 
on his previous work in this area,1 Green studies three elements to 
determine blameworthiness (p.72).  The first element is harmfulness to 
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others.  The second is the mens rea, or mental state required for an offense, 
usually consisting of intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.  The 
third element is moral wrongfulness in the sense of the breach of a norm, 
rule, right, or duty. 
 
Green first turns his attention to the harm in theft, which generally consists 
of substantial interference with property that is both commodifiable and 
rivalrous (p.74).  He argues that theft law should reflect the value of the 
property stolen, though he does not believe that the law can take into 
account the subjective value of property to the victim (pp.76-77).  Green 
also shows the difficulties inherent in defining the mens rea for theft, such 
as how to best define the necessary “intent to deprive” (pp.84-87).  How 
permanent does the deprivation need to be?  What if a perpetrator takes an 
object with the intent to return it and changes his mind later?  
Unsurprisingly, there turns out to be variation between jurisdictions on 
some of these matters that cannot escape some degree of arbitrariness. 
 
Green goes on to discuss the wrongs of theft, which he separates between 
primary and secondary wrongs.  Primary wrongs are those occasioned by 
the violation of a property right itself (p.93).  Green explains that “the norm 
against stealing does have a prelegal, natural existence, but that the norm is 
so thoroughly mediated and shaped by the law of property and by other 
cultural and social forces that we cannot make much practical sense of it 
without reference to such influences” (pp.95-96).  Green cites four types of 
evidence for the prelegal aspect of the prohibition against stealing.  The first 
is that society views stealing as wrong as a purely moral matter because it 
“is regarded as both sinful and deeply threatening to society” (p.96).  
Second, some forms of theft are illegal but not immoral while others are 
viewed as immoral but not illegal (p.96).  Third, even young children have a 
sense of ownership and an awareness that taking another’s belongings is 
wrong (p.97).  Fourth, anthropological studies have shown that groups and 
tribes with only the most rudimentary system of laws enforce prohibitions 
against stealing (p.98).  When it comes to the post-legal nature of theft, 
Green shows how property, contract, and agency law actually fill in the 
content of the basic prohibition against stealing (p.99).  His study of the 
primary wrongs of theft in practice take him through the concepts of lack of 
consent, unlawfulness, fraudulence, and dishonesty (pp.104-114). 
 
As far as the secondary wrongs of theft are concerned, Green defines those 
as the wrongful means that accompany the deprivation of property (p.115).  
He showed in his empirical study that these means are very relevant to the 
extent of individuals’ judgments of the gravity of different kinds of thefts, 
The IP Law Book Review  14 
and he walks readers through the issues of violence, coercion, 
housebreaking, stealth, breach of trust, exploitation of the circumstances of 
an emergency, and deception (pp.117-131).  For offenses involving each of 
these types of wrongs, Green uncovers the tensions that underlie close cases 
and provides guidance as to how he would resolve them. 
 
Chapter 3, “Theft as a Crime”, deals with the ability and need of the 
criminal law to respond to theft.  After giving an overview of the civil law 
and non-legal tools to address theft, Green presents his view of how and 
when theft should be treated as a crime.  He explains that criminalization is 
generally justified because “[t]hose who steal challenge the authority of 
property rules; they express contempt for the property owner and for society 
more generally; they trample over others’ rights in pursuit of their own 
selfish interests” (p.141).  Green explains how the state has traditionally 
been viewed as justified to intervene in theft because individual civil 
plaintiffs will not always be willing and able to seek remedies, the state can 
best prevent violent retaliation, and theft run amok can undermine the sense 
of trust between citizens (pp.144-146).  Not entirely satisfied with these 
explanations, Green proposes a two-step inquiry as to whether a form of 
theft should be criminalized.  In the first step, lawmakers would have to ask 
themselves if “the crime type typically or normally involved (1) the kind of 
conduct that is properly declared wrong by the community as a whole, (2) a 
non-negotiable wrong of the sort that one should expect to be categorically 
safe from, and (3) something more than a mere conflict that can be 
negotiated and resolved” (pp.147-148).  The second step of the inquiry 
would have prosecutors apply the same analysis when faced with an alleged 
criminal (p.148). 
 
In his discussion of the state’s interest in preventing theft, Green mentions 
the direct financial costs of theft, estimated at about $15 billion per year in 
the United States, but also the indirect costs that come in the form of 
reduced property values, lowered life satisfaction, raised anxiety, and 
damaged neighborhoods (p.149).  Green supports a classical economic 
approach to establish an optimal system of criminal sanctions (p.151).  He 
acknowledges that it is difficult to prove the deterrent effect of theft law 
with any precision and that in some cases of theft, the costs of 
criminalization may exceed the benefits (pp.152-55).  Green concludes 
Chapter 3 with an extensive discussion of borderline cases of theft such as 
de minimis thefts, theft by failing to return lost or misdelivered property, 
receiving stolen property, theft by false promise, writing bad checks, and 
extortion that involves a threat to do an unwanted but otherwise legal act.  
In the end, he criticizes the MPC and to some extent the English Theft Act 
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1968 for subjecting these forms of conduct to the same level of punishment 
and allowing proof of one to be sufficient to constitute proof of any other 
(pp.157-202). 
 
Chapter 4, “Property in Theft Law”, attempts to understand why in Green’s 
empirical work participants made clearly different moral judgments 
depending on the type of stolen property involved.  His study showed that 
people viewed the stealing of a physical book as more wrongful than the 
unlawful downloading of an electronic book or than sneaking into a lecture 
without paying the entrance fee (whether the lecture was sold out or not) 
(p.204).  Green’s goal is to understand the rationale of study participants in 
this respect and to determine what deserves the label of “theft”, which 
ultimately determines “how an offense is formulated, classified, and 
codified; how such lawbreaking is viewed by the general public; the level at 
which punishment will be assigned; and how prosecutorial policy will be 
carried out” (p.207).  Green states that any property subject to theft must be 
commodifiable, rivalrous, and excludable, and that every theft must create a 
genuine zero-sum transaction (pp.208-211).  Next, he analyzes the 
applicability of the theft label to variations of property within these 
categories, like things illegal to buy, sell, or possess (such as contraband 
and stolen goods); things legal to possess but not to buy or sell (such as 
body parts); and things incapable of being bought or sold (such as credit in 
the case of plagiarism and honor in that of the Stolen Valor Act) (pp.211-
225). 
 
The book then moves on to the topic of the unlawful taking of semi-
tangibles such as electricity, cable, and Wi-Fi services, as well as other 
private and public services.  After examining to what extent theft of the first 
three types of services occasions losses to the seller or third parties, Green 
concludes that the strongest case of theft is for electricity, followed by cable 
and then by Wi-Fi (pp.225-230).  Green also believes that unlawful 
behavior in the case of other types of services is best pursued via breach of 
contract claims rather than criminalization and the use of the theft label 
(pp.230-234). 
 
Most of the rest of the book focuses on the theft of intangible property.  
After showing that some forms of such property can be commodifiable but 
not always also rivalrous in the way that theft law requires (p.238), Green 
explains how identity theft is a misnomer because “personal identities are 
nontransferable and therefore noncommodifiable” (p.245).  He then tackles 
the main forms of intellectual property as they relate to theft.  As Green 
mentions, both intellectual property (especially copyright) owners and the 
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Department of Justice routinely refer to some forms of infringement as theft 
(p.246).  As far as social norms are concerned, far more individuals engage 
in illegal downloads of copyrighted materials than in theft of tangible 
property (p.249). 
 
Green questions whether copyright can be subject to theft law by testing 
whether the materials it covers are indeed commodifiable, rivalrous, and 
subject to zero-sum transactions (p.255).  He gives the hypothetical 
example of a copyrighted monograph with limited market potential that is 
available for download on the publisher’s website for forty dollars and that 
is expected to sell about 1,000 copies (p.255).  In variation one of the 
scenario, a defendant makes an illegal download for personal use.  In 
variation two, the defendant downloads the book, makes 1,000 digital 
copies, and distributes them to libraries and individuals that she thinks 
would likely buy the book otherwise.  In variation three, the defendants are 
1,000 likely buyers who circumvent the paywall on the publisher’s website 
and each illegally download a copy of the book for personal use.  Green 
notes that the material in question is a nonrivalrous public good, and hence 
the typical zero-sum nature of tangible property theft is not present, but he 
notes that the copyright owner lost, or potentially lost, a thing of value in 
each case anyway (p.256).  He argues that variation one does not constitute 
theft because the owner has suffered only a limited setback to his property 
interests but no deprivation of his property (p.256).  In variation two, the 
defendant possibly deprived the owner not only of the purchase price paid 
by the defendant himself but also of that paid by another 1,000 purchasers, 
and thus theft has occurred (p.256).  In variation three, while the total 
financial loss to the owner is the same as in variation two, “no single 
offender or group of offenders is sufficiently culpable to justify 
criminalization” (pp.256-257). 
 
A similar analysis follows for patent infringement, where Green believes 
that losses of a certain level (mainly, the loss of the value of a patent), could 
turn an offense into theft (pp.258-259).  He acknowledges some of the 
special problems related to patent infringement, however, including the 
difficulty of criminalizing such infringement in light of the uncertainty 
about the validity of an infringed patent, as I have also discussed in my 
work on the matter (p.257).2   
 
When it comes to trademark infringement, Green brings up the existence of 
two kinds of victims.  First are consumers who mistakenly buy counterfeit 
goods, and second are trademark owners who lose sales when potential 
customers buy counterfeits or who are deprived of potential licensing fees 
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(pp.260-261).  Green also references the risk that the use of a trademark on 
lower-quality infringing goods will lead to a weakening of the mark and 
that, therefore, trademarks are “at least semi-rivalrous in the sense that if 
anyone other than the trademark owner uses the mark, it will normally 
interfere with the benefits the owner derives from the mark” (p.261).  
Should an infringer completely or almost completely deprive a mark of 
value, this could result in the use of a label of theft (p.261). 
 
The type of intellectual property that Green deems to be the best fit for theft 
law is trade secrets, whose value is often greatly diminished once 
confidentiality has been destroyed (p.264).  Last, Green believes that virtual 
property such as website URLs and the goods in massively multiplayer 
online role playing games (MMORPG) could technically qualify for theft 
law purposes, even though in the latter case a gaming company could 
eliminate a game without owing players indemnification for accumulated 
virtual property (pp.265-267). 
 
Concluding Chapter 4, Green cautions that just because something could 
qualify as theft, criminalization is not always wise (pp.267-268).  Green 
also stresses that only misappropriations that involve deprivation of the 
owner’s ability to substantially use her property should possibly be labeled 
as theft (p.268).  Green emphasizes that other legal and non-legal means can 
serve to prevent theft, and that some areas such as plagiarism and 
MMORPG theft should remain outside the purview of legal regulation from 
a policy perspective (p.269). 
 
Green’s parting words acknowledge that this book constitutes a “first cut”, 
whose main goal is to encourage other scholars and policymakers to engage 
in a more meaningful discussion about theft law (p.270).  Green offers some 
advice for law reformers wishing to engage in related debates: avoid 
overcriminalization; balance concerns of fair labeling with administrability; 
define both the actus reus and mens rea elements; define property for 
purposes of theft law; grade theft offenses according to three independent 
variables: the value of the stolen property, the means by which the theft was 
carried out, and the type of stolen property; specify how to allege and prove 
theft; and in some cases allow reprosecution for a different form of theft 
than that originally charged (pp.271-276). 
 
13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE is a much-needed book in the world of 
legal scholarship.  Stuart Green provides the most thorough account of the 
foundations, logic, and tensions of theft law of which I am aware, thus 
giving an unparalleled overview of an important and strangely neglected 
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field.  As with any book that seeks to offer a readable account of a broad 
and complex area, some gaps and questions remain.  For example, while 
Green offers his thoughts on whether a significant number of hypothetical 
scenarios should qualify as theft, several of the dilemmas he presents are 
left unanswered.  To name just one example of where the lesson to draw 
remains a bit elusive, Green discusses how the case for labeling the 
unlawful taking of cable television services as theft is more difficult than 
that for the taking of electricity (pp.228-229).  He then moves on to 
discussing Wi-Fi services, however, without giving further guidance as to 
whether he would deem any taking of cable television services to be theft 
(p.229).  Rather, he says a bit later that the case for labeling Wi-Fi 
piggybacking as theft is weaker than that for the taking of electricity or 
cable, and that one possibility would be to treat such piggybacking as theft 
only if it results in degraded service for others (pp.229-230).  I would have 
enjoyed reading a bit more about his ideas of what this means in the end as 
to the optimal criminalization of each of these types of services under theft 
law rather than just as to the relative merits of doing so. 
 
Some of the greatest strengths of Green’s book stem from the breadth and 
depth of his knowledge of criminal law, which he brings to life through 
both historical examples and sometimes amusing yet always enlightening 
examples from pop culture.  The section on theft in intellectual property 
could have been expanded further in my view, in particular because the 
book seeks to focus on “Theft Law in the Information Age” as the second 
part of its title indicates.  One of my questions about the copyright section 
was how to determine the total pre-infringement value of a good given that 
Green would apparently only allow for a finding of theft if most of the 
value has been removed.  Even leaving aside some of the other 
complexities, the value of a copyrighted good significantly fluctuates over 
time and is often more subjective than that of tangible property, and it 
appears disconcerting to have such a potentially arbitrary criterion  
determine criminalization.  
 
Further, in Green’s example with the three variations on the monograph 
download, I remained curious as to how he would feel about some hybrids 
of the scenarios he gives (pp.255-256).  For example, if someone who 
illegally distributes copies to 1,000 potential buyers may be a thief, what 
about someone who just tells 1,000 potential buyers how to circumvent the 
paywall and access the material themselves?  Perhaps more poignantly, I 
am not sure why Green exempts individuals who each only downloaded for 
themselves from theft liability when he states elsewhere in his book that 
exempting de minimis takings from theft law in the context of tangible 
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property is unlikely to work because “[b]y creating a license to steal low 
value items, it would undermine the norm against theft generally and 
potentially raise the aggregate level of . . . theft to intolerable levels” 
(p.169).  What is the meaningful difference for theft law, to draw a 
comparison to variation three of Green’s hypothetical, between 1,000 
people each taking one dollar from a man’s wallet that contains no more 
money afterwards and the 1,000 likely buyers of the monograph each 
illegally downloading the text and hence depriving the owner of its value?  
Why are the individuals in the latter scenario insufficiently morally culpable 
to subject them to criminal law punishments when those in the former 
scenario are not?  These tensions pose some important difficulties for 
Green’s framework and his requirement of individually caused substantial 
deprivation of value for intangible goods in the context of theft law. 
 
In future work, Green may also want to give greater credence to the 
possibility that a number of intellectual property goods outside of trade 
secrets and virtual property are actually to greater or lesser degrees 
rivalrous.  For example, Green allows for the possibility that trademark 
dilution harms owners.  As others3 and I4 have argued, however, there is a 
chance that dilution could also harm the consumers of the originally 
branded goods, leading to a diminished enjoyment of it and potentially also 
a lowered resale value.  Whether that should enter the calculus when it 
comes to the theft label is subject to exploration, but these are some 
examples of issues that had to remain untouched due to how condensed the 
section on intellectual property is in the book. 
 
Stuart Green has given us much to consider, and I have only touched on 
some of the fascinating issues with which we can now wrestle more wisely 
and better equipped with knowledge thanks to 13 WAYS TO STEAL A 
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Near the end of Dev Gangjee’s wonderful monograph, RELOCATING 
THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, and thinking about 
its impact, my mind turned to a different issue relating to geography—
that of maps.  By the mid-sixteenth century a flourishing trade in maps 
and sea charts had developed throughout Europe.  Yet cartographers still 
struggled at this time with a fundamental problem of representation: 
namely, how to project the curved surface of the world on a flat map.  
The problem of inaccurate maps and a lack of a uniform approach to 
projection was particularly acute for seafarers, many of whom would 
describe identical sea journeys in ships’ logs by reference to very 
different latitudes, depending on the maps they were using.1  
Cartographers squabbled over which projection of the world was the 
most accurate, but without a uniform standard developing.  In 1569, 
Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator produced a giant map of the 
known world titled Nova et Aucta Orbis Terrae Descriptio ad Usum 
Navigantium Emendate.  Drawing on a grid-based cylindrical projection 
developed by Ptolemy in the second century AD, the key advance in 
Mercator’s map was his spacing of parallel lines of latitude so that the 
gaps between them increased exponentially the further they moved away 
from the equator.2  The effect of this was that any straight lines drawn 
between any two ports on the map accurately represented both the 
distance between those two ports and a bearing that a navigator could 
take to make the journey.  In the empty space on his map over North 
America, Mercator wrote that his mission was “to represent the 
positions and the dimensions of the lands, as well as the distances of 
places, as much in conformity with very truth as it is possible so to do”.3   
Mercator’s map and projection had an almost immediate impact as a 
navigational aid.  But it had a far greater significance in shaping how we 
see and understand the world.  This is something that can still be felt 
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today—you only need to go to Google Maps and zoom out as far as 
possible to see a modern day example of the Mercator projection. 
 
Gangjee’s monograph is to geographical indications scholarship what 
the Mercator projection is to cartography.  It solves problems that have 
bedevilled scholarship in this field for a century, and imposes order on, 
and makes sense of, a field of law that the author rightly describes as 
“spectacularly messy” (p.1).  The reasons for this mess are well known.  
The nature and scope of protection that must be afforded to, and the 
institutional forms of protecting, indications of geographical origin 
(IGOs) are unsettled throughout the world—something reflected in the 
bewildering array of terms and acronyms used to describe various types 
of IGO and in the outwardly inexplicable dual levels of protection for 
geographical indications (GIs) contained in Articles 22 and 23 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.4  Debates over IGOs, whether undertaken by 
government policy-makers or commentators, also tend to be highly 
polarized, often shaped by cultural beliefs that a particular model of 
protection is the only appropriate means of safeguarding IGOs.  Beyond 
a limited consensus that IGOs should be protected against use that 
misleads consumers as to the origin or qualities of goods, there is no 
agreement as to whether more extensive protection (for example, against 
dilution or pure misappropriation) is warranted, what legal form such 
protection should take, or to what extent it is appropriate to privilege  
“localized” production in international trade when to do so imposes 
costs on importing countries. 
 
Gangjee’s thesis is that only by stepping back and trying to understand 
how signs that indicate the geographical provenance of goods came to 
be protected in international intellectual property law from the late 
nineteenth century can we evaluate the current legal landscape, in 
particular, the GI provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, and think 
constructively about the future of GI protection.  Taking such an 
approach involves setting up new epistemic frameworks to explain why 
IGOs have been conceptualized and protected as they have at the 
international, regional and domestic levels.  It also involves calmly 
mediating the often hostile debates that have occurred over the 
regulation of IGOs, which only seem to have intensified with the 
growing recognition amongst some countries, particularly from the 
developing world, of the potential export value of geographically 
branded goods.  Gangjee has succeeded admirably in achieving his 
stated goals.  His novel organization of the topic, the new insights he has 
been able to provide based on his exemplary, comprehensive research, 
and his even-handed, critical engagement with the claims made by both 
advocates for and opponents of stronger GI protection, are likely to 
change the thinking of many scholars in this field and help to shape 
future global debates and policy agendas.  As Mercator’s projection did, 
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Gangjee’s monograph should become the key, unifying resource in its 
field.  
 
Part I of RELOCATING THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS consists of a detailed, historical, interdisciplinary 
analysis of IGOs, something which has not been undertaken in this sort 
of depth or with this sort of intellectual rigor before.  Here, Gangjee 
unpacks the decisive contribution of three treaties—the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, the Madrid 
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods of 1891, and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection 
of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration of 1958—
as well as a number of domestic IGO protection regimes, in order to 
explain the way in which IGOs emerged over the twentieth century as 
distinct legal subject matter that took a wide variety of forms.  This is 
highly original work that sheds light on a largely forgotten body of law.   
More fundamentally, it makes a convincing case that understanding the 
current international GI framework and making normative arguments as 
to the optimal scope of international GI standards can only be done after 
first untangling the skein of regulation that developed over the previous 
hundred or so years, and fully engaging with the question of “how has 
the GI come to mean what it does and function in the way that it does?” 
(p.14). 
 
In Chapter 2, in considering the Paris Convention, Gangjee deals with 
the overlooked question of why “indications of source”—signs that 
merely describe the provenance of goods—were deemed worthy of 
protection in an industrial property treaty.  He demonstrates, through a 
thorough analysis of extrinsic materials, that the “valuable intangible” 
sought to be protected was in fact the collective reputation that attached 
to regional products.  Indications of source were, accordingly, treated as 
similar, though ontologically separate from, trade marks, with Union 
members required to provide broadly similar rights against the use of 
“false” indications under Article 10 and misrepresentation by way of 
Article 10bis.  In this way, Gangjee identifies an early model of IGO 
protection that recognized the collective nature of the subject matter, 
with the scope of protection based on a purely communicative logic—
that is, that the indication provided useful information to consumers 
about the origin of goods produced by one of a number of local traders 
entitled to use the indication.  At the same time, Gangjee uncovers a 
strong degree of opposition amongst founding members of the Paris 
Union, notably France, to a minimum standard of protection based on 
consumers having been misled.  The concern here was that such a 
standard was inadequate to protect indications in export markets, where 
the indication might not be understood as having geographical 
significance.  Gangjee suggests that a desire for more absolute 
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protection explains the quickly assembled Madrid Agreement of 1891, 
the effect of Articles 1(1) and 4 of which is to oblige members to ensure 
the seizure on importation of wine bearing false indications of source, 
even if those indications are generic in the country of importation.  Here, 
Gangjee identifies the emergence of a different logic underpinning IGO 
protection—that certain indications might represent not only origin, but 
also a unique link between product and place, such that they ought never 
to be able to be used as generic product descriptors, irrespective of what 
consumers in a particular country might understand the term to mean.  
That is, we start to see the emergence of a terroir logic underpinning 
IGO regulation, albeit at this stage only in relation to geographical terms 
used to identify one type of product, namely, wine. 
 
It is at this point that what might appear to be an unusual decision in 
terms of the structure of the monograph makes perfect sense.  Having 
identified two different and competing logics underpinning international 
IGO protection (the communicative and terroir logics), Gangjee turns 
away from the multilateral regime to explore these logics as manifested 
in a number of national models of IGO protection.  This is done to show 
that any attempt to understand how the notion of “the GI” that emerged 
in international intellectual property law at the end of the twentieth 
century cannot be undertaken by reference to international conventions 
alone.  Rather, it requires an appreciation of the seemingly irreconcilable 
interests of those advocating for particular standards and forms of IGO 
protection, which can only be achieved by an examination of their 
national laws and their rural policies.  Gangjee’s approach also allows 
for a wider critique of the two logics based on their historical origins 
and development, which is important given his stated desire to reframe 
the global debate about the justifications for protecting GIs at particular 
levels. 
 
The primary focus of Chapter 3 is therefore on the development of the 
terroir-influenced French Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) 
system.  In a superb analysis at the start of the chapter, Gangjee unpacks 
the obscure notion of terroir.  He argues that it can be conceived of as a 
“mythical” or spiritual bond between place and product that has been 
used for the purposes of regional identity formation, a “deterministic 
influence” that prioritizes the uniqueness of physical and environmental 
elements in the production of goods, or “a more contingent composite of 
natural and human factors, open to innovation” (p.85).  He then 
demonstrates how the French system of IGO protection was informed by 
this second, deterministic notion of terroir, with a gradual recognition of 
the third, composite notion.  More specifically, in a painstakingly 
researched and engagingly written part of the chapter, he shows how in 
the late nineteenth century the French state, prompted by significant 
vine shortages which led to fraudulent origin labelling of wine, sought to 
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intervene in the market for wine by managing production levels in wine-
producing regions.  Through various decrees, it first sought to define the 
boundaries of such regions and, following the adoption of the AOC 
regime from the 1930s, to administer the registration of the names of 
such regions and to prescribe the qualities, characteristics and methods 
of production of wines from such regions whose producers were entitled 
to use registered names.  On the basis that registered names were 
thought to indicate unique qualities and characteristics of wine, these 
laws gave entitled producers the right to prevent non-entitled traders 
from using the registered name outright (that is, even for the purposes of 
comparison).  The value of Gangjee’s historical approach is that it 
shows how contingent the strong French sui generis model of protection 
was on a range of purely domestic factors that helped shape its rural 
policy.  His analysis also raises real questions about the “transferability” 
of such a model to the international stage, something he takes up in later 
chapters.  At the same time, Gangjee charts a subtle shift in the French 
AOC model in the increasing importance it placed on human factors, 
such as stable customs or localized knowledge, in the production of 
regional goods.  In doing so, his approach avoids falling into the trap of 
caricaturing terroir as a fabricated idea of uniqueness based on static 
conceptions of place, and instead recognizes the potential significance of 
human know-how and its intersection with geographical factors as 
explaining why IGOs might serve more than a communicative function, 
which might then impact on the scope of protection afforded to them. 
 
This characterisation becomes especially important as Gangjee returns 
to the international arena in Chapter 4, which focuses primarily on the 
Lisbon Agreement of 1958, an agreement underpinned by terroir logic 
that sets up a multilateral registration and protection scheme for 
appellations of origin for all products.  Gangjee makes a strong case 
that, despite its low membership, this treaty is worth examining because 
it shows not only how the French notion of the appellation of origin 
came to be received in international discourse, but also some of the 
significant difficulties involved in structuring an international agreement 
around the category.  He traces particular problems with the Lisbon 
definition of “appellation of origin” (such as whether it contains an 
implicit requirement that the qualities or characteristics of the named 
product be unique to its place of origin, or whether human factors alone 
would be sufficient to justify protection), and with the registration 
scheme designed to “settle . . . matters of definitional validity and 
protected status in the home country, then export this status to the entire 
Lisbon Membership” (p.157).  
 
It is at this point that the monograph takes another unexpected, but 
entirely justifiable, turn.  Rather than offering a descriptive account of 
the operation of Article 3 of Lisbon, which requires Members to protect 
The IP Law Book Review  26 
 
registered appellations “against any usurpation or imitation, even if the 
true origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in 
translated form or accompanied by terms such as ‘kind,’ ‘type,’ ‘make,’ 
‘imitation,’ or the like”, Gangjee engages with the normative arguments 
that could be marshalled to justify protecting IGOs at particular levels.  
In doing so, he makes the original claim that Lisbon is not aimed at 
preventing “dilution” or even “misappropriation” of geographical 
names, but rather that it obliges “absolute” protection, based on a 
contractual model where each Member has recognized the mutual 
advantage in providing unqualified protection to others’ appellations.   
This is the most convincing explanation of Lisbon put forward to date, 
particularly given the small number of countries responsible for its 
negotiation.  It also helps explain why such a model is unlikely to be 
accepted by WTO Members more generally, except in the context of 
bilateral arrangements between Members that are negotiated on a similar 
“contractual” basis. 
 
Having set up the competing epistemic frameworks and charted the 
tortuous history of IGO protection domestically and internationally, 
Gangjee turns in Part II to the GI provisions in the TRIPS Agreement.  
Here, he builds on his thesis by arguing that TRIPS, being “burdened 
with unstable compromises” based on competing communicative and 
terroir logics, cannot provide a coherent blueprint for international 
protection.  Despite this, he suggests that it is the very “indeterminacy of 
its provisions [that] makes possible the reconceptualisation of GI 
protection within the existing framework” (p.184).  To this end, Chapter 
5 explores the origins, operation, and indeterminacy of TRIPS, while 
Chapter 6 looks to the flexibilities within TRIPS for accommodating “an 
alternative or supplementary epistemology of GIs” (p.266).  
 
Chapter 5 covers territory that is likely to be familiar to scholars of GIs, 
but it does so in a fresh way, affording new insights throughout.  For 
example, most treatments of GIs in TRIPS start by focusing on the 
disagreement in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations over whether, 
and to what extent, IGOs ought to be protected in a treaty intended to 
have broad membership.  Gangjee goes further back, discussing the 
attempts at WIPO from the mid-1970s to construct the “geographical 
indication” as subject matter occupying a different conceptual space 
from both the Paris-based indication of source and the Lisbon-based 
appellation of origin, and showing how this approach provided the 
foundations for the TRIPS GI definition.  He then challenges the idea 
that TRIPS represents a major advance in this area of the law, arguing 
that what was agreed in TRIPS was a heavily negotiated compromise 
between the EU and the US, based on their fundamentally different 
understandings of the message and guarantee associated with geographic 
terms and the appropriate legal mechanisms for protecting them against 
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misuse, underpinned by competing communicative and terroir logics.  
In one remarkable passage (pp.224-229), he shows that the position is 
even more convoluted than this.  He demonstrates that the reason that 
the TRIPS definition of a GI requires only that the reputation of the 
good (rather than its quality or a specific characteristic) be essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin for the indication to be protected 
was not the result of a desire to accommodate the certification mark 
models of protection in countries such as the US and Australia.  Rather, 
it was the product of competing understandings within the EU over what 
sort of geographic terms should be protected (something reflected in the 
EU’s internal, dual model of protection, which itself fuses 
communicative and terroir logics).  Exploring these themes of 
compromise and instability further, Gangjee then addresses the lack of a 
normative basis for the differing levels of protection contained in 
Articles 22.2 (the Paris-based misrepresentation standard, applying to 
GIs for all products) and 23.1 (the Lisbon-based absolute standard, but 
applying to GIs for wine and spirits only).  He also offers a lucid 
account of some of the limitations of the exceptions contained in Article 
24, notably those dealing with generic terms and with the relationship 
between GIs and trade marks.  Although this is not by any means its 
primary purpose, Chapter 5 could serve as an excellent stand-alone 
primer for those seeking a detailed, nuanced understanding of the TRIPS 
GI provisions.  More than this, the chapter succeeds as critical analysis, 
in that it upends the teleological reading of TRIPS that has taken hold in 
some scholarship (that is, that TRIPS should be seen as a useful 
“consolidating project” (p.262) that has set up clear, stable, global rules 
for protecting IGOs). 
 
It might have been expected that the monograph would conclude with an 
analysis of the ongoing GI debates in TRIPS—over whether the absolute 
protection contained in Article 23.1 should be extended to apply to GIs 
for all products, and over the nature of the multilateral notification and 
registration scheme required to be set up under Article 23.4.  Chapter 6 
does deal with these issues, but Gangjee’s main interest in this 
penultimate chapter lies elsewhere.  His concern here is to ask whether 
there are different logics and other justifications for protecting GIs, 
particularly those that might support something more than 
misrepresentation-based protection.  His central argument is that if the 
object of legal protection is recognized to be not just the geographic sign 
but also the product itself, this might greatly expand the range of 
potential justifications for legal protection.  Thus, drawing on 
agricultural economics, he considers arguments for protecting such 
products based on biodiversity conservation and on rural development 
(that is, the improvement of rural incomes and the sustenance of rural 
populations by privileging regionally produced goods in international 
trade).  Gangjee concludes by considering that the most promising 
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rationale, particularly given the growing interest in GIs amongst 
developing countries, relates to the protection of traditional knowledge.  
Specifically, he suggests that “‘absolute’ protection could potentially be 
explained on the basis that it recognizes a certain form of TK—the 
savoir faire or local knowledge identified in Chapter 3 and potentially 
incorporated within the TRIPS definition in Chapter 5” (p.287).  His 
concluding argument here, building on his historical work in Part I, is 
that reserving the use of certain names to the “original” producer group 
both recognizes the collectively generated and intergenerationally 
transmitted knowledge that has gone into the production of the goods 
and allows space for such knowledge to continue to evolve. 
 
This is a rich, densely packed book, and a major contribution to the 
scholarship in the discipline.  But, like the Mercator projection, it does 
have some limitations, particularly in the way in prioritizes some issues 
(and countries) over others.  For example, while Chapter 3 does an 
excellent job of deconstructing terroir and explaining the emergence of 
the French sui generis model of protection, the treatment of other 
countries’ models of protection in this chapter is underdeveloped.  
Although the communicative logic of IGO protection as reflected in 
German and British law is more easily explained, it would have been 
useful to have considered the rural and trade policies of Germany and 
the UK in this chapter.  In addition, it would also have been useful to 
have addressed the experiences of other key agricultural exporters 
(many with large immigrant communities) at this point, in exploring 
why it was that the conditions for AOC-style protection did not emerge 
throughout the world.  This would also have given more context in 
Chapter 4 as to why the Lisbon Agreement is generally viewed as being 
of such marginal importance and why recent calls for Lisbon’s 
“misunderstood potential” to be recognized by WTO Members5 have 
perhaps received such a muted response.  Further, while Gangjee draws 
an insightful connection in Chapter 3 between early French boundary 
determinations and the current Australian and US wine GI registration 
schemes, this analysis tends to gloss over the context of the latter 
countries’ adoptions of GI-specific laws and the influence of bilateral 
arrangements in this regard.6  While Gangjee touches on the role of GIs 
in bilateral and preferential trade agreements at various places in the 
book, more might have been made on the relationship between these and 
the multilateral sphere.  This is because such agreements bring into 
focus how much GIs have been used by particular countries as 
instruments of pure trade policy, where one trading partner is asked to 
afford higher or absolute levels of GI protection in exchange for other, 
non-GI related, trade benefits.  With a growing number of preferential 
trade agreements making specific provision for GIs in this manner, this 
calls into question the importance of debates at the multilateral level 
over appropriate standards of protection.  At the very least it suggests 
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that despite the growing number of WTO Members arguing in favor of 
GI extension, any renegotiation of the international standards is unlikely 
to take place on the basis of principled arguments, but rather only if 
appropriate trade concessions (potentially extending well beyond 
intellectual property issues) are granted.7 
 
A related concern is with Gangjee’s discussion of alternative 
justifications for protection in Chapter 6.  While this thought-provoking 
chapter contains some of the most sophisticated interdisciplinary 
research in the monograph, the arguments here are perhaps not quite as 
sharp, and the conclusions not as fully realized, as in many other places 
in the book.  Recognizing that GI protection might be justified on 
various non-trademark related grounds does not, of itself, provide 
normative arguments in favor of increasing international levels of 
protection beyond the misrepresentation standard.  A separate case 
needs to be made that the rationale for protecting regionally produced 
goods in one country justifies mandatory international standards that 
oblige importing countries to privilege such goods in their domestic 
markets, notwithstanding the market distortions that might be involved.  
One can both support, for example, the EU’s internal attempts to sustain 
its rural economy through strong GI protection and query the costs that 
exporting EU levels of protection would impose on other countries in 
which European goods are sold.  Further, the idea that the preservation 
of traditional knowledge can provide a normative argument that 
supports absolute levels of GI protection raises difficult questions about 
the precise role that legal standards play in ensuring that developing 
country producers can secure access to foreign markets, and whether 
other issues such as ensuring adequate investment in local production, 
quality control, proper marketing, and fair distribution of returns form 
the sale of geographically branded goods are in fact key here.8  The 
problem with the attempt to draw a link between justifications and levels 
of protection is encapsulated by a quote at the end of the chapter, where 
Gangjee suggests that “[i]f the products—and those who produce 
them—are sufficiently valued or important, then the associated sign 
ought to be reserved for the home producer group, regardless of the 
sign’s reception before a given audience” (p.296, my emphasis). Yet this 
begs the question of exactly how this “sufficiency” is to be worked out 
in the international sphere: at what point does the desire to safeguard, or 
the value of, the human know-how of a community take precedence 
over the communicative function of the sign in a different country?  (Or 
is this something that can realistically only be determined on a bilateral 
basis?)  These are extremely difficult normative questions and, in 
fairness, Gangjee recognizes that the ideas he raises in the latter part of 
Chapter 6 are at an embryonic stage, and are best seen as a call for 
future research.9  
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Notwithstanding these minor concerns, RELOCATING THE LAW OF 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS remains an outstanding monograph.  
It is beautifully and engagingly written, impeccably researched and, 
above all, compellingly argued throughout.  It imposes much needed 
clarity and order over the law of GIs, but not at the expense of 
complexity, nuance or analytical rigor.  It is the most authoritative text 
that has been written on the topic, and will be an invaluable aid to 
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Julie Cohen has made extraordinarily illuminating contributions to the field 
of law and technology.  In CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, 
she articulates a compelling normative framework for her earlier 
interventions.  Her method is eclectic, situated, and particularist.  She 
adopts no sweeping philosophical desiderata to unify her treatment of 
intellectual property online.  Nor do economic measures of efficiency and 
utility motivate the project.  
 
Cohen’s CONFIGURING is instead a book that takes online subjectivity 
and community seriously, in both its established and emergent forms.  It 
cautions against either public or private entities trying too hard to monitor 
and control information flows online.  It does so not in the name of fairness, 
welfare, utility, or deontology, but in the name of play—or, more 
expansively, recognizing the value of intrinsically worthwhile, “pursued-
for-their-own sake” activities on the net.  Grounded in cultural theory and 
thick descriptions of life online, Cohen’s work should lead thinkers within 
law—and well outside it—to reconsider how they think about critical 
problems in the design and regulation of technology. 
 
To demonstrate this, I’m going to focus less on how CONFIGURING 
should affect others’ thought, and more on how it changed how I think 
about digital copyright infringement.  In past work, I’ve endorsed legal 
reform that is broadly in the mainstream of technocratic meliorism,1 
including a proposal to tax broadband to compensate artists based on their 
popularity. 
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Those who take CONFIGURING seriously can’t endorse such a proposal 
without more adequately acknowledging its “costs.”  Moreover, Cohen 
shows us why the term “costs” deserves scare quotes.  Influenced by her, I 
use it here only in the broadest sense of “negative effects,” and not to claim 
the patina of quantified rationality enjoyed by cost-benefit analysis.  
 
My review focuses first on the practical implications of CONFIGURING, 
then addresses Cohen’s methodology.  A cautionary note: CONFIGURING 
is an extraordinarily rich, dense book.  Rather than merely applying extant 
cultural theory to law, Cohen tends to distill it into her own distinctive 
social theory of the information age.  Thus, even relatively short sections of 
chapters of her book often merit article-length close readings, optimally 
done by a reader far better schooled in social theory than me.  What I can 
offer here is a brief for the practical importance of Cohen’s theory, and 
ways it should influence Internet policy and scholarship. 
 
As Cohen shows in her discussion of “the emergence of architectures of 
control,” both government and corporate efforts to manage computers and 
the Internet have a long history. The 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
criminalized “unauthorized access” to “protected” computer systems.  In the 
1990s, a series of changes in copyright law parried the impact of new 
technologies of reproduction and distribution of works.  Worries over 
cybersecurity, industrial espionage, and pornography also shaped legislative 
battles and law enforcement decisions. 
 
By the late 1990s, the Internet appeared to be at a crossroads, drifting either 
toward either “info-anarchy” or “perfect control.”  Just as the major record 
labels seemed to have secured an impregnable oligopoly, services like 
Napster disrupted their (and many other content owners’) control over 
works.  “File sharing” provoked new technology and law designed to 
control users’ activity.  Cohen wrote a series of articles at the time 
critiquing misguided initiatives and proposing technology and law that 
would give users some assurance that rights they traditionally enjoyed in the 
analog world would endure as more works went digital.2 
 
Then, as now, there has been a divide between an academic community 
deeply committed to promoting user rights, and the content managers who 
aspire to monetize works.  Some academics proposed a middle ground, 
designed to separate the issue of control from compensation.  In the past, 
when Congress realized that new technology would lead to widespread 
copying, it often imposed a small fee per copy—a practice known as 
compulsory licensing.  This regime, still in place for many works, could 
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perhaps be applied to digital copying, assuring some payment to artists and 
distributors without trampling free speech and a thriving remix culture.3   
The recording industry itself has repeatedly (and successfully) lobbied to 
force composers and lyricists to accept a governmentally set compulsory 
license; turnabout is fair play. 
 
Some say that the compulsory licensing regime can’t work in the Wild West 
of untrammeled Internet distribution.  But Terry Fisher has offered a 
detailed proposal in PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND 
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT.4  The Fisher plan would subsidize 
culture by lightly taxing the communication networks that enable its 
uncompensated duplication, and distributing the proceeds to artists based on 
how often their works are accessed and viewed.  
 
I have endorsed proposals like Fisher’s in the past.  And yet, looking at 
them from the perspective of Cohen’s “networked self,” I grow more 
skeptical. To work well, the new compulsory licensing must rely on 
pervasive surveillance of what is being listened to and watched.  If purely 
based on “number of downloads” or “number of views”, it would  provoke 
extensive gaming.  We’ve already seen scandals concerning artists who 
allegedly manipulated their YouTube view count (either to gain more ad 
revenue, or to appear more popular than they actually were).  Such gaming 
will in turn provoke countermeasures—monitoring who is viewing and 
liking what.  Do we really want some central authority to collect all this 
information, merely in order to ensure that Lady Gaga gets, say, 100 times 
more revenue than Lana del Ray?5 
 
After reading Cohen’s work, it’s hard not to see technocratic plans for 
allocating entertainment industry revenue as an instance of “modulation,” 
an effort to monitor and exercise soft control over certain communities 
(here, artists).  We should reconsider the plasticity of institutions like 
compulsory license fees.  Maybe there should be minimum compensation, 
to assure some degree of security to all artists (WPA 2.0?), and maximum 
gains, to discourage gaming at the high end?  Perhaps the aspiration to 
precisely calibrate reward to “value,” as measured by the number of times 
something is viewed or watched, fails on its own economic terms: a 
particularly effective film may do its “work” in one sitting.6  Or someone 
might reasonably value one experience of a particularly transcendent song 
over 100 plays of background music.  
 
The larger point here is that there is not just a tension between the play of 
creativity and the copyright maximalism of dominant industry players.  
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Even the most progressive reform proposals can unintentionally warp 
creative endeavors in one way or another.  The legal establishment has more 
often than not tried to wall out these considerations: “we’ll worry about the 
law and the money, and let the artists themselves figure out the creative 
angle.”  But, as Cohen shows, the experience of play and creativity are at 
the core of the enterprise—they shouldn’t be treated as “add-ons” or 
independent of legal deliberations.  We can’t get cultural policy right if we 
fail to consider what better and worse modes of artistic creation are on the 
terms of creators themselves. 
 
What if it turns out that properly calibrating risk and reward is a near-
impossible task for law?  I’m reminded of the insights of John Kay’s 
OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST ACHIEVED 
INDIRECTLY,7 and in that spirit, let me make a side observation on the 
way to my point.  At least in my experience, the best way of predicting 
whether someone would pursue a career in the arts was a wealthy spouse or 
family.  The word is out: it’s simply too risky to try and make a living as a 
painter, musician, actor, or poet—particularly given constant pressure for 
cuts to welfare benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid in the United States.  
 
But in other countries, where the social safety net is more generous, the 
possibility of failure is not so bone-chilling.  Consider the fate of J.K. 
Rowling, who hit “rock bottom” (in her words) while writing, and had to 
rely on Britain’s benefits system.8  A few years of support allowed her to 
get a foothold in the literary profession—and without it, Harry Potter might 
never have been written.  The implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 
2014 is one bright spot for the marginally employed in the United States.  
Perhaps we’ll find, decades hence, that the biggest impetus to artistic 
careers (and independent employment of all kind) was guaranteed issue of 
health insurance policies via state exchanges, and subsidies to purchase 
them.  Perhaps the health policy experts will do more to advance creativity 
than all the copyright policymakers combined, simply by assuring some 
breathing room for the (hopefully, temporary) failures of those in creative 
industries. 
 
These reflections may not gather much of a following in an academy that 
prizes methodological rigor and citation counts over whimsy and the 
acknowledgement of contingency.  But the academy’s own disciplines and 
forms of problem definition can obscure as much as they clarify.9  Their 
appeal can be more rhetorical than substantive.  As Cohen has stated: 
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[T]he purported advantage of rights theories and economic 
theories is neither precisely that they are normative nor 
precisely that they are scientific, but that they do normative 
work in a scientific way. Their normative heft derives from a 
small number of formal principles and purports to concern 
questions that are a step or two removed from the particular 
question of policy to be decided . . . . These theories manifest 
a quasi-scientific neutrality as to copyright law that consists 
precisely in the high degree of abstraction with which they 
facilitate thinking about processes of cultural transmission.10 
 
Cohen notes many “scholars’ aversion to the complexities of cultural 
theory, which persistently violates those principles.”11  But she feels they 
should embrace it, given that it offers “account[s] of the nature and 
development of knowledge that [are] both far more robust and far more 
nuanced than anything that liberal political philosophy has to offer . . . . 
[particularly in understanding] how existing knowledge systems have 
evolved, and how they are encoded and enforced.”12  
 
A term like “knowledge system” may itself seem very abstract, and far from 
the urgency of contemporary debates about privacy or intellectual property.  
But its very open-endedness and capaciousness is precisely what is needed 
as technology advances and leaves us in an increasingly “weightless” 
economy and society.  As more economic value is located in software 
systems, “big data”, pattern recognition, and the “lords of the cloud” with 
privileged access to all these processes, we ought to feel more free to 
reimagine the terms of social cooperation—not less.  These systems are in 
principle more plastic than the industrial economy they are supplanting—
but may well end up being less easy to influence to reflect public values.13 
  
Notably, Cohen evokes imagination in two of her chapter titles—
“Imagining the Networked Information Society” and “Reimagining 
Privacy.”14  The value of her emphasis on particularism—and the cultural 
theory such close reading of actual practice supports—lies precisely in its 
ability to catalyze creative thought about social arrangements, fueled by 
attention to actually existing cultures and creativity and discretion.  Like the 
“constructed commons” project of Madison, Strandburg, & Frischmann, 
Cohen’s work points to experiments in information sharing (and protecting) 
that need to be preserved against standardization according to monolithic 
economic or philosophical models. 
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Inspired by Cohen’s work, we may well be able to get beyond the usual 
antinomy of information as “end product” (which justifies a high purchase 
price) vs. “input” (which is used as a justification for policies that set a zero 
or low price on content, like fair use or compulsory licensing).  Cohen’s 
work insists on a capacious view of network-enabled forms of knowing.  
Rather than naturalizing and accepting as given the limits of copyright law 
on the dissemination of knowledge, she can subsume them into a much 
broader framework of understanding where “knowing” is going.  That 
framework includes cultural practices, norms, economics, and bureaucratic 
processes, as well as law. 
 
We’ve seen that kind of ambition before, in Lawrence Lessig’s CODE: 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE.15  But Cohen is not willing to 
accept its pathbreaking “modalities” approach to the shaping and control of 
human action.16  As stated in Chapter 7 of CONFIGURING: 
 
The four-part framework [of Lessig’s CODE] cannot take us 
where we need to go. An account of regulation emerging 
from the Newtonian interaction of code, law, market, and 
norms [i.e., culture] is far too simple regarding both 
instrumentalities and effects. The architectures of control 
now coalescing around issues of copyright and security 
signal systemic realignments in the ordering of vast sectors 
of activity both inside and outside markets, in response to 
asserted needs that are both economic and societal.17 
 
What is happening beyond the CODE framework?  Aside from the 
theoretical rationales Cohen givens, historical developments motivate a 
move beyond Lessig’s pre-millennial framework. 
 
The Internet is in many ways centralizing power.18  But life online runs the 
gamut from frivolity to high public purpose.19  As Ethan Zukerman 
observes, these high and low aims can be mutually reinforcing.20  A video 
like “Collateral Murder” can be spliced into MIA’s “Vicki Leekz” 
mixtape.21  A Twitter community formed around cricket may turn to 
political activism, and vice versa.22  As images, music, and words get 
recopied, repurposed, and remixed, symbolic orders emerge undisciplined 
by the usual triple authority of church, state, and home. 
 
As legal scholars, we’re conditioned to jump to the normative questions 
immediately, asking “is this a good thing?”  It’s tempting to flee to free 
speech-fundamentalism (“promiscuous publication and zero privacy, uber 
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alles!”) or control fetishism (“lock down and propertize!”) in order to 
respond decisively to fast-paced events.23  Cohen insists that before we take 
any normative stance toward the blooming, buzzing confusion of Internet 
life, we had better understand it.  Cultural theory is above all specific—to 
time, place, and people grappling with situated struggles. 
 
Reading Cohen’s book, I was reminded of classic debates about the role of 
social science, philosophy, and values in law.  As David Kennedy and 
William W. Fisher III have observed, 
 
Law students struggle to understand the relationship between 
“the rules” and the vague arguments that lawyers call 
“policy.” Should “policy” begin only in the exception—
when legal deduction runs out—or should it be a routine part 
of legal analysis? If the latter, how should lawyers reason 
about policy? What should go into reasoning about 
“policy”—how much ethics, how much empiricism, how 
much economics? Which of the arguments laypeople use 
count as professionally acceptable arguments of “policy” and 
which do not? Which mark one as naïve, an outsider to the 
professional consensus? What is it about policy argument 
that makes it seem more professional, more analytical, more 
persuasive, than talking about “mere politics”?24 
 
Cohen cleared the ground for CONFIGURING in earlier works like 
Lochner in Cyberspace and Copyright and the Perfect Curve.25  In those 
articles, she explored how ostensibly neutral and objective philosophic and 
economic approaches failed to rise above “mere politics” in many contexts.  
Combining her analytic critique with the narrative of legislative history in 
Jessica Litman’s DIGITAL COPYRIGHT,26 one is hard-pressed to interpret 
modern copyright policy as much more than a messy compromise between 
the commercial interests of massive communications, content, and Internet 
firms.  That law has created a set of baseline expectations that is hard to 
rationalize on either economic or philosophic grounds.  Moreover, efforts to 
justify small departures from it on such grounds miss a greater and more 
necessary subject of critique and reconsideration: namely, the larger 
information system that intellectual property and surveillance laws are 
underwriting.  
 
As more traditional scholars battle over whether Comcast’s property and 
free speech rights should trump those of their customers,27 Cohen suggests a 
more open-ended approach.  How invasive is the deep packet inspection 
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that an Internet Service Provider like Comcast proposes?  Who gets to 
monitor its monitoring?  Why is it performing this surveillance?  Are 
financial criminals as likely to be targeted as, say, copyright infringers?28  
Who gets the data?  What type of activity will be chilled by this 
intervention?  Can users opt out, or is the fused public and private power 
here for all intents and purposes monopolistic?  As she notes, “[s]ome 
information policy problems cannot be solved simply by prescribing greater 
‘openness’ or more ‘neutrality:’” 
 
[R]ights of access to information and information networks 
do not necessarily correlate with rights to privacy; indeed, 
they more typically function in the opposite way. As network 
users become habituated to trading information for 
information and other services, access to goods and services 
takes place in an environment characterized by increasing 
amounts of both transparency and exposure . . . . [H]uman 
flourishing in the networked information society requires 
additional structural safeguards. 
. . . . 
. . . .  The lives of situated subjects are increasingly shaped 
by decisions made and implemented using networked 
information technologies. Those decisions present some 
possibilities and foreclose others. Most people have very 
little understanding of the ways that such decisions are made 
or of the options that are not presented.  In many cases, this 
facial inaccessibility is reinforced by regimes of secrecy that 
limit even technically trained outsiders to “black box” 
testing. We would not tolerate comparable restrictions on 
access to the basic laws of physics, chemistry, or biology, 
which govern the operation of the physical environment.  
The algorithms and protocols that sort and categorize 
situated subjects, shape information flows, and authorize or 
deny access to network resources are the basic operational 
laws of the emerging networked information society; to 
exercise meaningful control over their surroundings, people 
need access to a baseline level of information about what 
those algorithms and protocols do.29 
 
Trying to theorize rights and utility claims in the absence of such 
information may be an exercise in futility.  We can’t grasp the landscape 
without a map. 
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A short review can only scratch the surface of Cohen’s contributions in this 
book.  So far, I’ve barely mentioned the type of selfhood her work aims to 
support.  CONFIGURING’s construction of the “networked self” is deeply 
insightful, and deserves at least some comment. 
 
There is a lucky class of people who live to work, but most tend to work in 
order to live.30  The point of life is in non-work—time to spend with family 
and friends, enjoy culture (low, high, and in between), to reconnect with the 
ultimate sources of value and meaning, and to communicate about all of 
this.  This balance of work and leisure, or instrumentally rational action and 
value-driven action, is a theme of political economy.  In a field preoccupied 
with the fair allocation of rewards from work(s) of various kinds, Cohen 
emphasizes the “play” of culture, subjectivity, and material practice in 
respective parts of her book.31  She helps us understand that “play” isn’t just 
something that happens on the edges of a life well lived—it’s often the 
point. 
 
Cohen’s work on play fills in a concept simultaneously hypostatized by 
natural law theory (Finnis calls play one of the seven basic human goods), 
and too often left under-explained within it.  As Cohen shows, play is 
indeed capacious, ranging from remixes of music videos and punning on 
Twitter to the “freedom to tinker” with devices and undisturbed exploration 
of alternate points of view (or even alternate selves).  Considering some of 
the edgier forms of play, we may well understand why the natural law 
theorists have left it relatively underdeveloped (in comparison with other 
basic goods like sociability, religion, life, and aesthetic experience).  
Moreover, one person’s play can be another’s boring chore (I remember 
how enthusiastic I was as a kid to play Monopoly, and how my poor 
overworked father recoiled, in mock horror, from another round of 
“Monotony”).  Play can be paradoxical, creating (within its general aura of 
rest and Csikmenthalyian flow) spaces of reward and frustration, 
achievement and stigma.  But those alternate spaces are (supposed to be a) 
refuge from the daily grind of getting and spending, control and submission, 
that are characteristic of our more hierarchically ordered economy and 
politics. 
 
Space for play and leisure has been politically contested.  Patterns of rest 
and work considered perfectly acceptable under feudalism had to be altered 
dramatically by capitalist enterprise.  Workers fought back over decades, 
demanding limits on the workweek and certain basic rights.  And that 
revolution has in turn inspired a counterrevolution in our time, promoted by 
both neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies.32  Under neoliberalism, the 
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sphere of play must either contract or bear profit.  Under post-9/11 
neoconservativism, there is an increasing emphasis on surveillance of all 
aspects of life, leaving little room for the unsupervised, unmonitored 
encounters vital to certain forms of intersubjectivity and self-expression.33 
 
Leading neoliberals and neoconservatives employ the rhetoric of emergency 
to announce “there is no alternative” to the social arrangements that their 
theories, in truth, merely recommend.34  Our social networks do not need to 
be fonts of advertising revenue; our artists should not need to shake down 
every would-be fan.  At least in the developed world, there is ample social 
surplus to support these are far more creative endeavors.35  Nor does the 
“terrorist threat” merit the level of surveillance or policing now targeted at 
political activists, copyright infringers, and travelers.  The economic 
pressure of austerity and the political movement for absolute “security” are 
in this sense “play emergencies” in the pejorative sense of play: performed, 
pretended, miniature.36  The men behind the curtains of banks and law 
enforcement agencies ominously warn of horrible consequences should they 
not get their way.  In response, we must question: when is the cure of 
control worse than the diseases of disorder it promises to eliminate?  When 
is “disorder” really an unrecognized, spontaneous order, worth preserving 
rather than taming and transforming? 
 
Cohen’s book will not give us definitive answers to these questions.  But in 
forcing us to consider them, it substantially broadens the horizon of inquiry 
in what are classically considered “intellectual property and privacy” 
disputes.  While narrow specialists in each field tend to develop tunnel 
vision, the lived experience of Internet users inevitably discloses their 
intertwining (with every EULA clicked, or ad served, or warning given 
about the consequences of infringement and industry and government’s 
ability to watch it).37  Powerful trends would ever more tightly restrict 
individual access to content, and ever expand the ability of various 
authorities to monitor that access.  Cohen’s work forces us to reconsider 
those social forces in light a true “play emergency”—the declining number 
of free, unmonitored, unmonetized opportunities ordinary people have to 
pursue creative expression, cooperation, and consumption.  Preserving and 
expanding those spaces is as worthy a vocation as promoting economic 
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